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MinireviewMental Concerts: Musical Imagery
and Auditory Cortex
Robert J. Zatorre1,* and Andrea R. Halpern2 certs”? What are the psychological and neural mecha-
nisms associated with these processes?1Montreal Neurological Institute
A handful of studies have now been carried out onMcGill University
this topic using a variety of techniques, including, mag-Montreal, QC
neto-encephalography (Schürmann et al., 2002), posi-Canada H3A 2B4
tron emission tomography (Halpern and Zatorre, 1999;2Bucknell University
Zatorre et al., 1996), and functional MRI (Halpern et al.,Lewisburg, Pennsylvania 17837
2004; Kraemer et al., 2005; Yoo et al., 2001), as well
as behavioral lesion measures (Zatorre and Halpern,
1993), which provide better evidence of causality than
Most people intuitively understand what it means to do functional measures. These diverse studies con-
“hear a tune in your head.” Converging evidence now verge on one principal finding: that neural activity in
indicates that auditory cortical areas can be recruited auditory cortex can occur in the absence of sound (Fig-
even in the absence of sound and that this corres- ure 1) and that this activity likely mediates the phe-
ponds to the phenomenological experience of imag- nomenological experience of imagining music. Beyond
ining music. We discuss these findings as well as this basic understanding, however, much remains to be
some methodological challenges. We also consider understood, including the relative contributions of pri-
the role of core versus belt areas in musical imagery, mary versus secondary auditory regions in each hemi-
the relation between auditory and motor systems dur- sphere, the participation of the frontal cortex to the im-
ing imagery of music performance, and practical im- agery process, and the role of musical training in
plications of this research. development of musical imagery. Before discussing
these substantive questions, however, we turn our at-
tention briefly to methodological issues.Cognitive neuroscientists are faced with a seemingly
Methodological Problems and Solutionsdaunting task: understanding how the brain enables us
The problem of measuring internal phenomena mightto experience our rich inner world of thoughts, feelings,
appear to have finally found a solution with functionaland images. The subjectivity involved in these internal
imaging techniques, since one can observe the un-processes provides a particular challenge because sci-
derlying neural activity more directly, rather than infer-entific methods require one to measure verifiable, ob-
ring its presence. Yet, we are still left with the concep-servable events. One domain in which this problem has
tual problem of knowing what is being measured. Thus,played out is mental imagery. Although behaviorists in
merely placing subjects in a scanner and asking themtheir heyday insisted that imagery was off limits be-
to imagine some music, for instance, simply will notcause of its obscure, subjective nature, clever cogni-
do, because one will have no evidence that the desiredtivists demonstrated early on that reliable behavioral
mental activity was actually taking place. Neural activ-measures could be obtained that served as indices of
ity can still be measured under these circumstances,what was going on inside the mind. Shepard’s classic
but it may well be related to other processes than thedemonstration of mental rotation (Shepard and Metzler,
one intended. One good solution to this problem in-1971) serves as an excellent example of how an overt
volves behavioral indices, such that an overt responsemeasurement (response time to judge the orientation
is measured that either depends on or correlates withof a letter) can provide evidence of a covert mental pro-
the imagined event. For instance, if we ask people tocess. In other words, one infers the existence of a pro-
imagine the first four notes of Beethoven’s Fifth Sym-cess based on observing some effect caused by that
phony and they correctly and consistently judge thatprocess; in this respect, cognitive approaches are not
the fourth note is lower than the third, then we haveso different from physics or other sciences in which the
objective evidence that an internal representation con-objects of study (neutrinos, black holes, or whatever)
taining pitch information has been accessed (Halpern,are simply not accessible.
1988). In the context of neuroimaging, such tasks haveRecent Advances in the Study of Musical Imagery
the disadvantage that they carry a lot of cognitive over-Imagery is not exclusively visual, as anyone can attest
head in the form of attentional, working memory, and
to who has ever been annoyed by some advertising jin-
response demands; but these can be accounted for
gle playing relentlessly in his or her mind. On a more
with appropriate control conditions. Simpler tasks, such
exalted level, composers such as Beethoven or Smet- as imagining the continuation of a known musical se-
ana, who became deaf later in their lives, nonetheless lection (Kraemer et al., 2005) can also be useful. But in
were able to compose magnificent music, presumably such tasks there is less control over the success with
because they were able to conjure up musical images which imagery may be achieved at any given moment,
solely internally. Many researchers have concentrated absent a behavioral correlate, such as the time taken
on understanding musical imagery in particular partly for the continuation, matched against the length of the
because of the ubiquity and vividness of imagined mu- excerpt. Using fMRI poses special problems because
sic. So what enables us to produce these “mental con- of the loud acoustical artifact produced by echo-planar
imaging, which itself results in a large auditory cortical
response. The interactions between this response and*Correspondence: robert.zatorre@mcgill.ca
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both the sung text and the musical component (Zatorre
et al., 1996). But when instrumental music is used
(Halpern et al., 2004), the pattern tends to shift toward
activation in the right auditory cortex, in accord with the
important role of these structures in processing pitch
information (Zatorre et al., 2002). The recent study by
Kraemer et al. (2005) did show left auditory cortex acti-
vation even with nonverbal materials, but the degree of
activity on the right, if any, was not reported, leaving
this question still open.
Assuming we can agree that auditory cortical activity
underlies the experience of imagery, the question still
remains, how does the auditory cortex become active
in the first place? The most likely explanation is that
top-down mechanisms are involved in reactivating neu-
ral traces that are somehow encoded in sensory cortex.
Figure 1. Lateral View of Right Cerebral Hemisphere Illustrating Long ago, Penfield observed that electrical stimulation
Area of Hemodynamic Increase, in Color, during an Auditory Imag- of the exposed surface of sensory cortical areas (Figure
ery Task
2) could result in the patient reporting illusory visual or
Although the task is performed in silence, activation is observed
auditory percepts (Penfield and Perot, 1963). The artifi-within auditory cortex in the posterior aspect of the superior tem-
cial electrical input from an electrode results in a hallu-poral gyrus. Data reanalyzed from Halpern et al., 2004.
cinatory rather than an imagery experience, but pre-
sumably under normal circumstances there is a signal
coming from elsewhere that accesses the sensory in-the one related to the formation of auditory imagery
formation in auditory cortex. It is most likely that in-makes interpretation difficult, particularly when the
teractions between frontal cortical areas and auditoryhemodynamic response functions between imagined
cortex are the way that imagery is instantiated. Thereand perceived events overlap (Kraemer et al., 2005).
is a tight anatomical connectivity between these re-This problem can be mitigated, however, by using
gions, and most studies that report whole-brain datasparse sampling or other noise abatement strategies.
involving the generation of an auditory image find fron-What Role Does Auditory Cortex Play in Imagery?
tal cortex to be an important component (Halpern andDespite these technical difficulties, most imagery stud-
Zatorre, 1999). Thus, when one wants to conjure up aies have indeed succeeded in demonstrating that the
song in one’s mind, frontal-based retrieval mechanismsauditory cortex responds even in the absence of sound
might be called upon; at the same time, feedback sig-and that this response tends to co-occur with sub-
nals from auditory cortex could be important in distin-jective reports of imagining music. But does the pri-
guishing between imagery and a real sound coming
mary, or core auditory cortex, participate in musical im-
from the environment. Indeed, Griffiths (2000) proposed
agery? A similar question exists in the field of visual
that a breakdown in this system might be responsible
imagery, but there is now substantial evidence that pri-
for the musical hallucinations that he observed in peo-
mary visual cortex can be recruited by certain tasks ple with acquired deafness. It is notable that this study
(Kosslyn and Thompson, 2003). The literature in musi- found no evidence for primary auditory cortex activa-
cal imagery to date is still uncertain on this point. Most tion, making suspect any argument linking primary cor-
prior studies do agree that activation in secondary, or tex activation with stronger phenomenology of imag-
belt, auditory cortex is reliably found (Figure 1). Al- ined sounds.
though some authors have reported activation in pri- Auditory versus Motor Imagery
mary cortex, the precise location of core areas can be Motor imagery is the imagination of the kinesthetics in-
difficult to determine because of the intersubject vari- volved in actual movement and has been examined for
ability of these structures; furthermore, because of par- both simple tapping sequences and complex musical
tial volume effects, what may appear to be activity in routines. One methodological challenge in examining
primary regions may actually represent spillover from brain activations in motor imagery is to insure that no
adjacent nonprimary zones. The most critical variable, actual movements have occurred, which can be ac-
however, is likely to be the task demands, as they have complished via EMG monitoring. Motor imagery for
proven to be in the visual domain. It is premature to nonauditory-associated movements sometimes results
anticipate what auditory imagery tasks might reliably in activation of M1 and often activates secondary motor
elicit primary activation, given the very small number of areas, such as SMA (Naito et al., 2002). Thus it should
studies carried out so far and the small subset of those not be surprising that musicians can evoke motor imag-
that have even sought to verify the precise location of ery for their instrument during imagined playing. For in-
the activation. stance, Langheim et al. (2002) asked string players to
An additional point that many of these studies ad- play or imagine playing a familiar piece; the times taken
dress concerns the lateralization of the response; once to play and imagine the pieces were highly correlated.
again, task demands and also the nature of the stimuli These authors found a number of areas to be active in
to be imagined likely play a role. For instance, bilateral frontal lobes, cerebellum, parietal lobe, and SMA, but
activation has been observed when familiar songs with not M1 during imagined playing compared to rest.
In many musical situations, sound is associated withlyrics are used, most likely because there is imagery of
Minireview
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Figure 2. Regions of the Exposed Cortical
Surface, Marked with Dots, which Resulted
in a Hallucinatory Experience of Hearing Mu-
sic Upon Electrical Stimulation
Modified from Penfield and Perot, 1963.
movement. Instrumentalists make extensive arm, fin- musical attributes. Highben and Palmer (2004) asked
pianists to learn an unfamiliar piece, under normal con-ger, and sometimes foot movements in the course of
producing their instrument’s voice. Singers use com- ditions or when they could not hear their own playing.
Players who tested high on an aural skills battery wereplex movements of the vocal apparatus to produce
songs, especially if they are putting words to those least disturbed in learning the piece without auditory
feedback, suggesting that their auditory imagery skillssongs. Given the behavioral and neural evidence for
people being able to imagine musical movements, is were adding in the necessary auditory experience
to facilitate learning. Humphreys (1986) reported thatthere evidence that auditory and motor imagery may be
integrated in the brain? Hickok et al. (2003) found that training in auditory imagery improved harmony skills
in children.area Spt (parietal-temporal boundary) responded to
both imagined auditory (both speech and music) and The research described above can also help illumi-
nate how musicians use mental practice. This skill in-covertly produced sequences in a similar fashion. In
perhaps a stronger test of this integration, Haueisen volves imagery in several modalities: visual (pianists
“see” their hands on the keyboard), motor/kinestheticand Knösche (2001) found that pianists showed activa-
tion in primary motor regions corresponding to the fin- (they “feel” the keyboard and finger motions), as well as
auditory. Experimental evidence bearing on the neuralger that would have produced a given note, even when
they were merely listening to pieces they knew how to processes involved is still quite limited, but Pascual-
Leone (2003) has demonstrated that mental practiceperform. Conversely, Haslinger et al. (2005) observed
activation in several auditory areas when musicians improves performance, albeit not to the level of real
practice. However, changes over time in the size of thewatched a silent video of someone fingering piano
keys. Thus, despite a rather different circuitry, imagery cortical representation of the motor cortex were similar
for real and imagined practice. Given the existence ofof related musical sounds and movement can be inte-
grated. This corresponds to reports from musicians cross-modal interactions, we may eventually be in a
better position to explain when and how these imag-that they can “hear” their instrument during mental
practice. ined experiences will actually benefit musicians and
thus be able to optimize practice regimes for individ-Cross-Modal Interactions
Processing in one sensory modality can affect process- uals as well as add to the literature on neuroplasticity
in response to expert training.ing in another, either by increasing or suppressing ac-
tivity; similar interactions also appear to occur if one or We have attempted here to argue that well-consid-
ered behavioral methods combined with convergentboth tasks are based not on perceptual, but on imag-
ined information. Langheim et al. (2002) found that neuroimaging and other techniques can successfully
externalize the particularly covert process of musicalimagining musical performances suppressed activity in
the auditory regions, although they suggested that it auditory imagery. This research allows us to gain insight
into one of the more inaccessible aspects of cognition,may have been related to suppression of scanner
noise. Halpern et al. (2004) also found that a visual im- and thereby provides us with valuable information con-
cerning the neural underpinnings of abstract mentalagery task suppressed activity in right secondary audi-
tory cortex (which was active in imagery for musical processes. Clinical or educational applications pertain-
ing to these highest levels of cognitive function willtimbre) to levels below that seen with a silent baseline.
As noise was not a factor given the sparse sampling emerge only to the extent that we can rigorously link
brain mechanisms to mental processes; we would ar-technique used, it seems that cross-modal interactions
may operate similarly in auditory imagery as they do in gue that the future of cognitive neuroscience will de-
pend on expanding just this sort of knowledge.the processing of actual sound.
Implications
Musical imagery is important to musicians, so an un-
derstanding of its neural basis may help us understand
aspects of expertise as well as provide some useful Selected Reading
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